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Abstract : Using two examples of ethical choice, Philippa Foot’s 
snake and the traffic roundabout, this paper offers an account of 
normative induction that characterizes particularism and generalism as 
stages of normative inquiry, rather than rival accounts of moral 
knowledge and motivation. 
Ethical particularism holds that the evaluative cannot be “cashed 
out” in propositional form, and that it is descriptively “shapeless.” 
Drawing on examples from law, this paper claims that, while individual 
normative inquiry may be viewed as encountering a shapeless 
particularist context of seemingly unlimited non-moral properties, 
normativity is driven by repetition of similar situations toward shared 
practices and descriptive predicatio n. Rather than retention of epistemic 
status by defeated reasons, this illustrates retirement of relevant 
properties and accompanying reasons, transformation of the reasons 
environment, and a pluralist normative ontology. 





I suspect . . . that there is no way of cashing out propositionally the 
ways in which non-evaluative properties contribute to the evaluative 
natures of situations, actions, characters. . . . The particularist’s claim 
is that the good-making relation cannot be cashed out in propositional 
form. 
Margaret Little 2000: 283, 285 
 
If this characterization by Margaret Little of moral particularism is 
correct, and if the statement is true, how, then, is moral knowledge 
communicable? How is it motivational? How is it even possible? 
Moral knowledge is communicated in general propositions. The 
latter are derived from particular experience. This paper characterizes 
particularism and generalism as stages of normative inquiry, rather than 
rival accounts of moral knowledge and motivation. The generalism- 
particularism debate fails to recognize a crucial difference between 
individual moral choice in unique situations (it is dangerous to pick up a 
snake, but it may be more dangerous not to pick up this one), and those 
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in common problematic situations (entering a roundabout), where 
emergent practice drives generalization, both of which are imperative for 
social order. 
 The argument is developed from an analysis of “reasons holism,” a 
central tenet of particularism. I claim from examples in law that while 
the holism of reasons can always be found in the unique individual case, 
it may prove temporary in the case of public problems, where of 
necessity reasons must be retired for the emergence of general practices 
and the rules that embody them.  I argue that this illuminates how the 
“good-making relationship” is “cashed out,” finding consistency 
inductively from experience, rather than deductively from principle. 
 
I. 
Ethical particularism is the view, opposing moral generalism, that 
the evaluative cannot be “cashed out” in propositional form (Little 2000: 
283), that it is “shapeless” with respect to the descriptive (279), and that 
there is no descriptive pattern unifying the class of right acts. (Jackson, 
Pettit & Smith 2000: 99). Robust moral particularism emphasizes the 
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multiplicity and variety of reasons for a particular ethical decision, 
reasons that can shift polarity from case to case. It is a reaction against a 
form of generalism that claims a limited set of reasons can dictate the 
same result (Dancy 1993: 57).   
Particularism emphasizes “reasons holism,” or the “context 
sensitivity” of relevant non-moral or factual properties. According to the 
holism of reasons, the list of such properties is long, and a consideration 
that is a reason in one context may not similarly be a reason in another, 
due to differences in the presence or absence of defeating and enabling 
conditions.  This holism of reasons is claimed as an essential feature of 
all ethical choice.   
By comparison, as a classical generalist position, R.M. Hare’s 
doctrine of universalizability holds that when a particular action is 
judged morally wrong, this is so on account of a discrete set of 
properties.  Consistency demands that any action that shares these 
properties is also wrong: 
Universalizability can be explained in various equivalent ways; it 
comes to this, that if we make different moral judgments about 
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situations which we admit to be identical in their universal 
descriptive properties, we contradict ourselves. (Hare 1981: 21)   
Ethical particularism has consistently contended, on numerous grounds, 
that the generalist’s “list of relevant properties” required to support 
universalization cannot coherently be limited.   
Generalists like W.D. Ross have recognized the problem of 
exceptions to every universal: no general can adequately account for all 
possible future cases.  Particularism has more difficulty with Ross’s 
more moderate view, that ethical generals offer only prima facie support 
for moral decisions.  Jonathan Dancy has responded that this pro tanto 
(or “for the most part”) position fails to account for defeated reasons in 
moral conflict, and for the “rationality of regret” that recognizes the 
unreduced epistemic status of the “defeated ought.” (Dancy 1993:111) 
An early example of the holist dimension of reasons was Philippa 
Foot’s snake example: she noted in 1983 that it is dangerous to pick up a 
snake, but it may be more dangerous not to pick up this particular one. 
Dancy comments, “The dangerousness of not picking up this one is not 
reduced by the dangerousness of picking it up,” and claims this 
 6 
 
demonstration of the “variable valence of factual properties” shows that 
the opposing reason “retains its full force.” (Dancy 1993:111, citing 
Foot 1983)   
However, consider Foot’s example in the context of circus snake 
charmers, who regularly gather venomous snakes for training and 
feeding.  At first it is equally dangerous to pick one up, or not to; but 
through repeated experience a practice is established in which the parity 
of opposing valences is retired. The practice develops when the situation 
is repeated sufficiently to become a common problem. Circus snake 
performers will adopt, from experience, strict rules that govern when 
and how snakes are to be picked up. The equal dangers of picking up, or 
not, are removed by the practice. It is no longer the case, then, that (in 
Dancy’s words) “the defeated non-comparative ought can remain true.” 
(1993: 111) The example suggests other occasions in which retired 
reasons do not retain their full force in defeat. Note, however, that in this 




Accordingly, I consider the case of entering a roundabout--but 
before any rule regarding rights-of-way. The rules of the road have 
derived for an entire community in a fashion comparable to the snake 
charmers’ practice: from necessity driven by experience, by practices 
emergent from the experience of potential injury. In an early particularist 
world, there was no settled rule for when and how drivers first entered 
what might have been the first English roundabout. This is a world that 
was (as a phenomenologist might say) “pre-predicative” with regard to 
traffic circles. I shall characterize the holism of reasons here as an initial 
condition. 
The list of relevant properties governing normative conduct can be 
shown to be initially long, demonstrable by a hypothetical early 
roundabout accident requiring inquiry into the right, good, or just result. 
Imagine yourself as the barrister representing Ms Quickly, who was 
struck by a lorry when she blithely dashed into an early roundabout. 
Damage and injury resulted, and a judgement must now be made as to a 
just accounting. As there was no governing rule, your client has sued the 
owner of the lorry, arguing that the lorry driver should have taken proper 
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action to avoid her.  The lorry driver has counter-sued, claiming that she 
plunged recklessly into his path. But absent any rules of the road 
governing “plunging” or “avoiding,” that is not all that the two drivers 
can argue regarding justice or rightness. Both Ms Quickly and the lorry 
driver might extend the inquiry to any claim conceivably bearing on a 
better result. 
As her advocate you may bring up everything favorable to the 
moral balance of her case, regarding the question of “who should pay,” 
including her being late to church, her unblemished driving record, and 
her unimpeachable character, and likewise the character of the lorry 
driver and the fact that the lorry was carrying a cargo of scandalous 
literature.  Counsel representing the lorry driver also has ample 
arguments from which to draw, including the economic importance of 
his client’s trip, effects on his career and livelihood, indeed the fact that 
your client is wealthy and he is poor by comparison. Moreover, the 
opposing advocate may “reverse the valence” of your own arguments 
regarding Ms Quickly, claiming that they weigh against rather than in 
favor of her case (“she should have known better”). Indeed, it 
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is common among barristers to reverse the valence of opposing 
arguments in close cases not controlled by settled rule.  
 However, once the rule establishing a presumptive right-of-way for 
any vehicle already in the roundabout has taken hold, none of this is 
relevant; Ms Quickly’s action, and the class of all similar actions, is now 
clearly predicable as wrong, and a judicial decision in her favor would 
be considered unjust. Indeed, the various reasons Ms Quickly might 
entertain to justify her haste in entering the already occupied 
roundabout, such as her being late to church, are discounted by the 
combination of rule and established practice governing other drivers, 
and their expectations that she will not enter the roundabout in such a 
manner as to require their emergency action. The ethical general derives 
motivational force from the entrenched rule and practice, and will 
override the individual reasons that she and other drivers may yet 
entertain about their own priorities. 
I note for later reference that predication of Ms Quickly’s hasty 
entry at this later stage as “wrong” or “bad” is not deductively related to 
a universal theory of rightness or goodness. This elucidates Little’s 
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observation that “the good-making relation cannot be cashed out in 
propositional form.” The “thin” moral properties of good or bad, right or 
wrong, are revealed here as resultant properties, originating 
independently of the properties from which they result. I will return to 
this point below, where I anticipate particularism’s response. 
How and why did the roundabout rule come about? A solution had 
to be found lest crashes in the roundabout continue unabated (Holmes 
1881: 113-23). The process was likely one in which cautious drivers 
tended to wait before entering the proliferating roundabouts, gradually 
establishing a practice. Meanwhile there would have been disputes to be 
resolved, in which arguments regarding specific litigants and their 
actions, purposes, relative wealth, etc. were increasingly ignored or 
rejected, until eventually legal authorities adopted a rule based on the 
preferred practice. 
In the early or novel legal case, just as in the contemplated 
individual act, there are aggravating and mitigating factors everywhere 
you look, on both sides, and moral particularism does not accept 
restrictive rules of relevant evidence. The various properties available as 
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reasons and advanced as arguments are narrowed by the emergence of 
cautionary practices, and the process of normative induction compares 
them in a gradual, rather than immediate, process, seeking Hume’s 
essential ingredient of similarity.  Hume wrote “[w]hen we have found 
a resemblance among several objects, that often occur to us, we apply 
the same name to all of them, whatever differences we may observe in 
the degrees of their quantity and quality, and whatever other differences 
may appear among them.” (Hume 1896: 16)  Normative generalism, we 
might then observe, is a product of establishing a commitment to finite 
and predicable (and “namable”) expectations. 
This is not to deny the illustrative value of particularist dilemmas. 
The famous trolley problem has demonstrated the variable valence of 
individual intentional states. A comparable real dilemma occurred with 
the prosecution in 1999 of physician Jack Kevorkian, convicted of 
second degree murder for providing a device to a patient who pushed a 
button releasing fatal chemicals. Kevorkian placed himself in the trolley 
position of tragic choice among alternative individual destinies. His case 
was initially unique, but the problem has demonstrated sufficient 
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repeated practical similarity for inductive comparison and predication, 




Having illustrated what I have called the retirement of reasons, 
what reply would particularism give to this account? Jonathan Dancy 
insists that defeated reasons always retain their epistemic status, and 
emphasizes instead how the “salience” of certain reasons guides moral 
decision. He writes, “defeated reasons are the normal result of moral 
conflict, where we face reasons of some strength on both sides of a 
disputed question, and so the question becomes what sense can be made 
of moral conflict by the sort of theory of moral reasons that I have been 
beginning to outline.” (1993:109)  Here Dancy draws on an observation 
by Bernard Williams that formed the latter’s own critique of generalist 
theory: 
It seems to me a fundamental criticism of many ethical theories 
that their accounts of moral conflict and its resolution do not do 
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justice to the facts of regret and related considerations: basically 
because they eliminate from the scene the ought that is not acted 
upon. (Williams 1973:175) 
Dancy then observes, “the defeated non-comparative ought can remain 
true. . . . Ross tried to capture this in his theory of prima facie duties, as 
Williams acknowledges, but he failed to retain the defeated comparative 
ought in its full vigour. The general idea is that the defeated ought has 
made its contribution by diminishing the overall rightness of the action 
that we in fact choose. That this is not sufficient as an account can be 
seen in Philippa Foot’s excellent example of picking up a snake.” (1993: 
111) 
As I have emphasized, missing from Dancy’s vision is the 
pervasiveness of adjusted practice, which populates the landscape of 
reasons supporting his perception of salience. Dancy observes that 
“some of the properties of a situation are relevant to the question of what 
one should do, and some are not . . . . These relevant properties are 
salient; they stick out or obtrude, and should catch our attention if we 
are alert.” When moral decisions are explained, according to Dancy, 
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salience is the critical measure: “When we come to give a description of 
the situation, the various saliences (i.e. the shape of the situation) make a 
difference to how we should go about it.” 
The father who tells his child not to take the flowers from the 
next door garden because that would be stealing should not be seen 
as subsuming this action under the general principle ‘Stealing is 
wrong’ (or perhaps ‘Do not steal’), but rather as pointing to the 
most salient feature of the situation (that the flowers belong to 
somebody else), which in this case gives sufficient reason for the 
child not to do it. (1993: 113) 
Salience, I conclude, consists inter alia in the acceptance of already 
existing patterns from normative induction. In coming upon a 
roundabout, dominating the holism of reasons would be the rule and 
practice of yielding to traffic already there. Particularism accepts the 
patterns of normative induction without recognizing that they have 
themselves emerged from a stage of indeterminate particularism. Surely, 
the landscape of normatively derived patterns is pluralist, and ill-suited 
to universal description, supporting Margaret Little’s observation 
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regarding the difficulty of “cashing out the good-making relationship.” 
But that does not imply a dominant and essential particularism. 
Holistic particularism rests on a classification error, that of 
considering the individual dilemma as typical of all moral experience. 
Particularism has challenged the very notion of identicality in real 
normative life, what Dancy terms “the rich multiplicity of lived 
situations.” (1993: x)  In conventional explanations of the inductive 
process, similarity among objects of inquiry is commonly presumed. 
Hume’s remark, “when we have found a resemblance among several 
objects, we apply the same name to all of them, whatever differences we 
may observe in the degrees of their quantity and quality, and whatever 
other differences may appear among them,” implies that an important 
part of the inductive process is the finding of similarity. The question to 
be addressed is whether, and how, similarity among normatively defined 
situations comes to be recognized and named. 
The trolley problem is illustrative but hardly representative in 
demonstrating the valence of intention. It originated with Foot in 1967 
(as an improvement on two older chestnuts, the explorers trapped by a 
 16 
 
fat man stuck in the cave entrance, and the judge faced with the mob 
threatening mass violence if the innocent man is not executed) in order 
to critique “the doctrine of the double effect.” (Foot 1978: 21-23)  “The 
doctrine of double effect offers a way out of the difficulty, insisting that 
it is one thing to steer towards someone foreseeing that you will kill him 
and another to aim at his death as part of your plan.” (Foot 1978: 23) 
Such hypotheticals, as well as Dancy’s everyday dilemmas (having to 
return a book to someone who stole it from the library, or break bad 
news to his sister, 1993: 60, 116), may serve to highlight aspects of 
individual moral conflict, including that they are not controlled by rule 
or principle, which is why they seem to support a global particularism. 
But in cases of successive experience with similar conflicts, as in 
medically assisted suicide, the practical resolution of real dilemmas 
takes precedence. 
Medically assisted suicide illustrates a further aspect of normative 
induction hidden from reasons holism, and hence missing from the 
generalism/particularism debate: the transformation, by repeated 
experience, of the reasons environment--of the character of available 
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reasons. In 1999 Dr. Kevorkian’s tragic decision took place when the 
risk of imprisonment was great, because criminal prosecution was the 
only option in a legal environment that recognized few of the medical, 
legal, and social considerations that accompany current debate. Philippa 
Foot’s 1977 paper, “Euthanasia,” treated the issue as an indeterminate 
dilemma, anticipating the questions--regarding living wills, better 
medical procedures, and patient protections--that would have to be, and 
gradually have been, addressed. (Foot 1978: 40, 48-51)  These have 
influenced the course of practice and legislation in the forty years since 
Foot’s essay. 
General rules are products of experience and necessity, and of a 
common situation that is explored in repeated judgements. In focusing 
only upon the defeated ought, particularists ignore that new reasons are 
forthcoming as old ones are retired. The distinction between the 
retirement and continued truth of defeated reasons indicates a critical 
difference in perspective with particularism. Retirement implicates 
successive points of experience within a community. Dancy’s 
perspective is synchronic and individual, whereas normative induction is 
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diachronic and social, treating moral decision as a process of inquiry, 
with distinct stages of reasoning. 
How is moral knowledge possible? In order to work it must be 
communicated, as science communicates natural knowledge. This paper 
proposes that the “shape” of moral generalism is to be found in the 
social response to discrete problems, revealing a pluralist, but not 
stubbornly particularist, nature to the normative landscape, one with 
pronounced (but not necessarily globally consistent) patterns and 
propositions. If this were not the case, there would be no communicable 
and actionable moral knowledge.  
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